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Essay
The Consumer Class Action
Bill of Rights:
A Policy and Political Mistake
LAURENS WALKER*

INTRODUCTION

The controversial Class Action Fairness Act of 2005' has provoked
widespread public discussion,2 chiefly because of jurisdictional provisions
which will likely place the bulk of major class action litigation in federal
court. But the rarely discussed Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights,
section 3 of the Act,3 is, I argue, the most significant provision of the new
law.4 The jurisdictional provision of the 2005 Act will have little
independent effect, but the Bill of Rights, which invites public
participation in class action settlements and regulates some settlement
terms,5 will prove to be a costly policy and political mistake. Moreover, I
argue that the effect of that mistake will be exacerbated by the otherwise

* T. Munford Boyd Professor of Law and Caddell & Chapman Research Professor, University
of Virginia School of Law. I wish to thank Ken Abraham, Toby Heytens, Brandon Garrett, and
George Rutherglen for comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Elissa Fix, Jeremy Graves,
Dan Hegwood, and Jared Whalen for able research assistance.
i. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, Class-Action Showdown, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2003, at AI6; John F.
Harris, Senate Takes Up Class-Action Restrictions; Consumer Groups Try to Soften Measure Forcing
Lawsuits Into Federal Courts, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2005, at A4; Editorial, The Class Action Unfairness
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at A3o.
3. § 3, 1 9 Stat. at 5-9. The complete title of section 3 is "Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights
and Improved Procedures for Interstate Class Actions."
4. The core of the Class Action Fairness Act consists of sections 3, 4, and 5. Section 3 includes
both notice provisions and provisions regulating the content of some settlement terms. Id. Section 4 of
the Act, titled "Federal District Court Jurisdiction for Interstate Class Actions," expands federal
question jurisdiction for class actions, and section 5, "Removal of Interstate Class Actions to Federal
District Court," facilitates the removal of class actions from state to federal court. Id. at 9-13.
5. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1711-1715 (West 2oo6).
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insignificant jurisdictional provision of the legislation and will enable
application of the Bill of Rights provisions to most major class action
cases litigated in the United States. This Essay is the first to
comprehensively examine the policy and political implications of this
legislation. 6
In Part I, I describe in detail the notice provisions of the Bill of
Rights and continue by describing and evaluating the responses available
to public officials. I estimate the probable role of the Attorneys General
of the several states, the United States Attorney General, and officials of
state and federal regulatory agencies. I predict a high degree of public
participation in class action settlements, especially by the Attorneys
General of the states. In Part II, I discuss the Bill of Rights' substantive
regulation of some settlement terms. These include stringent provisions
regarding "coupon settlements"7 as well as general prohibitions on
negative settlements8 and geographic discrimination.9 In Part III, I
provide context for understanding the notice and term regulation by
discussing earlier efforts to shift the structure of federal class action in
the direction of a public enforcement model. The chief example is
furnished by Justice Department proposals during the administration of
President Jimmy Carter which would have eliminated Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, the class action rule, and substituted, in part, a
"public action".. managed by the Attorney General of the United States.
I contrast these proposals with more recent suggestions by commentators
for enhanced private law enforcement in the class action format, and I
discuss the comparative efficiency of private versus public enforcement.
In Part IV, I discuss the jurisdictional provisions found in sections 4
and 5 of the Class Action Fairness Act. Here, I explain the change to
minimal diversity and the facilitation of removal to federal court. Then,

6. Although adopted in 2005, apparently none of the Bill of Rights provisions have ever been
considered in a published judicial opinion. The reason for this delay is that the Class Action Fairness
Act applies only to cases commenced after the legislation was signed by the President on February 18,
2005. See § 9, 119 Stat. at I14. Surely soon, however, cases commenced after the effective date will
reach the settlement stage and the judicial application process will begin. For early comment on the
Bill of Rights, see Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An IllConceived Approach to Class Settlements, 8o TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2006) (calling the Bill of Rights
"a series of unrelated provisions that achieve little and raise more questions than they answer"); Rick
Knight, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2oo5: A Perspective, FED. LAW., June 2005, at 46, 50-51

(questioning whether the Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights will yield any improvement in class
action litigation); and James Tharin & Brian Blockovich, Coupons and the Class Action FairnessAct,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcs 1443 (2005) (discussing the merits and potential effects of the Consumer
Class Action Bill of Rights provisions regulating coupon settlements).
7. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1712.
8. See id. § 1713.
9. See id. § 174.

Io. See, e.g., Small Business Judicial Access Act of I985, H.R. 464, 99th Cong. (1985) (the last of
multiple proposals calling for similar reforms).
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based on a recent Federal Judicial Center comparative study of class
actions in federal and state court, I predict that these provisions will
result in litigation of most major class actions in federal court, but with
little impact on the outcome of these cases. This Essay concludes that the
Bill of Rights view toward public enforcement is a costly policy and
political mistake. I argue that the shift will encourage malfeasance by
public officials, and add to information search costs. A better solution
would have been legislation providing more robust private enforcement
by reducing the agency costs of class members. I also argue that both the
national Republican and Democratic parties will pay a political price for
their roles in the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act and that
only the Attorneys General of the States, regardless of political party,
will benefit politically from the new legislation.
I. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS

A.

THE BILL OF RIGHTS REQUIREMENTS

The first version of the Class Action Fairness Act was introduced in
1997 by democratic Senator Herb Kohl of Wisconsin." The original

version had two principal provisions, a notice requirement and a "plain
English requirement" specifying the style of all notices sent to class
members in federal court.' In subsequent versions the plain English
requirement was dropped, 3 but the notice provision became law as part
of the Bill of Rights. The principal requirement is that each defendant
participating in a proposed settlement of a federal class action must
"serve upon the appropriate State official of each State in which a class
member resides and the appropriate Federal official a notice of the
proposed settlement."' 4 The "appropriate State official" is defined as
the person in the State who has the primary regulatory or supervisory
responsibility with respect to the defendant, or who licenses or
otherwise authorizes the defendant to conduct business in the State, if
some or all of the matters alleged in the class action are subject to
regulation by that person.' 5
"If there is no primary regulator, supervisor, or licensing authority, or the
matters alleged in the class action are not subject to regulation," then the

iI. Class Action Fairness Act of 19 9 7, S. 254, 105th Cong. (1997).

12. See id. § 2. Senator Kohl described his proposal as "necessary to address a troubling and
growing problem in class action litigation-unfair and abusive settlements that ignore the best
interests of injured plaintiffs while unscrupulous defendants and attorneys reap the rewards." 143
CoNG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Jan. 30 1997) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
13. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, S. 5 , io9th Cong. (2005).
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1715(b). This notice of proposed settlement must be served "[niot later than so
days after a proposed settlement of a class action is filed in court." Id.
i5.Id. § 1715(a)(2).
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State Attorney General is the "appropriate State official.' 6 An
"appropriate Federal official" is defined as the Attorney General of the
United States.'7
The Bill of Rights specifies the content of the notice as including: (I)
a copy of the complaint and related materials; (2) notice of any
scheduled hearings in the class action; (3) any proposed or final
notification to class members regarding opt-out and settlement; (4) any
proposed or final settlement; (5) any settlement or agreement made
between class counsel and defense counsel; (6) any final judgment or
notice of dismissal; (7) if feasible, the names of class members who reside
in each state and the proportion of settlement proceeds by state; and (8)
any written judicial opinions related to the other notice content.
The Bill of Rights goes on to provide that the district court may not
approve any proposed settlement until ninety days after proof of service
of the required notice,'9 and further provides that if a notice is omitted,
then a class member may refuse to be bound by the terms of the
settlement.20 Importantly, the Bill of Rights continues by stating,
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to expand the authority of,
or impose any obligations, duties, or responsibilities upon, Federal or
State officials," 2' and no procedure for responding to a notice is
established. Thus, the Bill appears to direct public2 officials to refer to
current law to determine the options for a response.
2

Practice under the notice provisions is not at this time developed and
as of this publication there are apparently no reported decisions.
However, several matters are clear from the face of the statute. First, the
requirement is meaningful because a binding settlement requires
compliance. Few, if any, defendants would agree to settle without an

16. Id.
I7. Id. § 1715(a)(i)(A). The statute also includes special notice provisions for cases in which
either a federal, state, or other depository institution is a defendant in a class action suit. See id.
§ 1715(c). While practice under this special rule is not yet established, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency has advised "national banks, their operating subsidiaries, and federal branches and
agencies to notify the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of proposed class action settlements
involving activities regulated by the OCC, such as deposit-taking or lending practices, or practices
associated with other bank products or services." Memorandum from Daniel P. Stipano, Deputy Chief
Counsel on Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 to Chief Executive Officers, Compliance Officers, and
Legal Counsel of All Nat'l Banks, Fed. Branches and Agencies, Dep'ts and Div. Heads, and All
Examining Pers. (Apr. 21, 2oo6), availableat http://www.mcglinchey.com/images/pdftint42D.PDF.
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1715(b)(I)-(8). If it is not feasible to provide the names of class members who
reside in each state and the proportion of settlement proceeds by each state, the statute allows for
reasonable estimates to be substituted. See id. § 17x5(b)(7)(B).
59. Id. § 1715(d).
20. Id. § 17t5(e)(i). Service of an appropriate notice bars noncompliance with settlement. See id.
§ 1715(e)(2).
21.

Id. § 171 5 (f).

22.

See infra text accompanying note 39.
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agreement binding on the entire plaintiff class. Second, providing notice
will generally be burdensome for defendants, particularly in light of the
scope of the requirement and the detailed information specified. Third,
many public officials will learn about proposed federal class action
settlements. The Attorney General of one or more states, often all fifty
states, will learn about proposed federal class action settlements due to
the default notification provision of the statute.23 The Attorney General
of the United States will learn about all proposed federal class action
settlements.24
B. PROBABLE RESPONSES
The crucial question at this point is: How will state and federal
officials respond when they receive the notices required by the Bill of
Rights? To predict their reaction, I look at the response of officials to
analogous opportunities. There is a history of activism by officials,
particularly state officials, which suggests there will be a vigorous
response to the Bill of Rights notices.
i. State Attorneys General
The key figures in determining state responses to a settlement notice
will almost certainly be the State Attorneys General. The Attorney
General is the default recipient of notice under the Bill of Rights and
also functions as the chief legal officer of the state.25 During recent years,
consumer protection has generated more interest among State Attorneys
General than any other single issue. Political campaigns for the office
now often involve promises of future actions on behalf of consumers or,
in the case of incumbents, claims of past success in protecting
consumers.26 The interests of individual State Attorneys General are
often quickly multiplied by the common practice of cooperation by
Attorneys General in the pursuit of common consumer protection
concerns. This practice, known as "multistate litigation," began several

23. See supra text accompanying note 16.
24. See supra text accompanying note 17.
25. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1715(a)(2).

26. See, e.g., David Van Os Democrat for Texas Attorney General, Why David Van Os?,
http://www.vanosfortexasag.com/why/ (last visited Mar. I, 2007) (challenger in Texas Attorney
General race vowing to improve consumer protection by promising "to protect the Constitutional
liberties of the people and to ensure that Texas belongs to the people as our Constitution intended,
instead of to the corporations and insurance companies to whom our state has been handed by the
mouthpieces of greed"); Mike Beebe for Governor, http://www.mikebeebe.com/about-mike.asp (last
visited Mar. 1, 2007) (current Arkansas Attorney General, running for Governor, lauding his previous
record of consumer protection by stating that, "[i]n his first two years as Attorney General, [his]
Consumer Protection Division engaged in enforcement efforts that resulted in judgments or
settlements of more than $13.5 million; helped prevent utilities from implementing more than $too
million in rate increases; and disbursed nearly $i million in individual restitution from antitrust actions
against pharmaceutical companies").
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decades ago and has steadily gained in popularity.27 Reports of multistate
litigation suits and settlements are routinely posted on the National
Association of Attorneys General website. 8
A prominent example of State Attorney General activism is
furnished by the career of Eliot Spitzer, former Attorney General of the
State of New York and current governor of New York. 9 Spitzer was
narrowly elected Attorney General of the state in 1998,3" but after four
years of well publicized aggressive action on behalf of consumers and,
particularly, investors, Spitzer was reelected by a margin of nearly 36%
of the vote3' and named Time Magazine's 2002 "Crusader of the Year."32
After four more years of activism, Spitzer was strongly favored to
become the next governor of New York. The well known and still
unfolding political career of Eliot Spitzer is a model for other State
Attorneys General.33
The obvious association between possible political advancement and
law enforcement is reason for concern. For example, given that the staffs
of the State Attorneys General are usually quite small, it is possible that
the necessity of choosing among enforcement opportunities might be
influenced by opportunities for favorable publicity rather than a
comparative analysis of the need to deter future harm. Nevertheless,
these developments over the last several decades suggest active
participation by State Attorneys General in response to Bill of Rights
notices is likely.
2.
United States Attorney General
The designated federal recipient of a Bill of Rights notice is the
Attorney General of the United States.' 4 The best federal analogy for the
27. See Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys
General in Multistate Litigation, ioi COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2003-08 (2001) ("Beginning early in the
i98os and without much public attention, state attorneys general began cooperating with each other in
ways they never had before.").
28. See generally National Association of Attorneys General, Press Releases,
http://www.naag.org/news/index (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
29. See New York State, Eliot Spitzer, Biography, http://www.ny.gov/governor/firstfamilyl
spitzerbio.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
30. See Jonathan P. Hicks, At Last, It's Official: Spitzer Defeats Vacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1998,
at B6.

3t. BROOKE A. MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER 120 (2oo6).

Id. at 6.
33. A prominent early example is the career of Robert Morgan of North Carolina. As Attorney
General, Morgan gained notoriety as a consumer advocate and a few years later was elected to the
United States Senate. Morgan wrote an article about his activist approach to the office of Attorney
General. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Robert Burren Morgan,
http:/Ibioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=Mooo956 (last visited Mar. 1, 2007); Robert
Morgan, The People's Advocate in the Marketplace- The Role of the North CarolinaAttorney General
in the Field of Consumer Protection,6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L. REV. I (1969). Though dated, the
article remains a guide for others to follow.
34. 28 U.S.C.A. § t715(a)(I)(A) (West 2006).
32.
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Bill of Rights notice provisions is a federal statute which requires notice
to the Attorney General of the United States about a legal proceeding
when the constitutionality of a federal statute is challenged.35 This
provision, adopted in 1937,3 requires the court to provide the notice and
explicitly permits the United States to intervene and become a party to
the litigation, but does not require a response.37 The response of
Attorneys General to notice under the 1937 statute has been moderately
active. The record shows many cases where the United States has
intervened,' but there have been a number of cases where notice was
given and no response was made.39 Perhaps this modest response rate
reflects typically modest political ambitions by United States Attorneys
General. In any case, the record suggests that the federal response to the
Bill of Rights notice would likely result in occasional active participation
in settlement review by the United States Attorney General.
C.

PROCEDURAL OPTIONS

Senator Kohl, the legislation's original sponsor, apparently
anticipated that attorneys general would actively participate in
settlement proceedings, commenting that "attorneys general can
intervene in cases where they think the settlements are unfair."4 But the
2005 legislation is itself silent about the form of official participation.
Although informal participation by public officials is a theoretical
possibility, as a practical matter it seems unlikely. One or more of the
parties to the case are likely to object, depending on the predicted view
of the officials, and often there will be occasions when all of the parties
object-all being happy with their proposed agreement. Much the same
can be said about government use of an amicus format. Beyond legal
argument-rarely central in settlement-one or both of the parties is
likely to object, claiming that there is no authority for such a rule."
35. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2ooo).
36. Act of Aug. 24, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-352,50 Stat. 751.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a).
38. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Jones & Lamson Mach. Co., 854 F.2d 629, 630 (2d
Cir. t988) (allowing the United States to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a statute);
O'Keefe v. N.Y. City Bd. of Elections, 246 F. Supp. 978,980 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("The constitutionality of
§ 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which is a statute affecting the public interest, has been drawn into
question. Under such circumstances, the United States has an absolute right to intervene.").
39. See, e.g., Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 (1984) ("[Tlhe Attorney General formally
notified Congress that the Executive would not defend the constitutionality of the [challenged Social
Security Act]."); In re Duncan, 201 B.R. 889, 902 n.16 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) ("The United States has
not sought to intervene in this case with respect to [the Thirteenth Amendment challenge] raised by
respondent [in a bankruptcy proceeding]."); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597,
598 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("In accordance with 28 U.S.C. [§] 2403(a) the United States Attorney
General was notified of the constitutional challenge raised by Chemical and was given the opportunity
to intervene. After a review of the pleadings, the Attorney General chose not to do so.").
40. 143 CONG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Jan 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
41. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government Participationin Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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Presumably, then, the first step toward a prediction about the likely form
of response is answering a subsumed question: What responses by public
officials are now permitted by federal procedure?
The most prominent option is intervention under Rule 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The consequence of intervention by
public officials under Rule 24 would be full participation by the official as
a party in the case and hence in the settlement process. Since all parties
to litigation must consent to settlement before the case can be dismissed,
public officials might, by intervention, gain a veto power over the
settlement of all federal class actions. Rule 24 provides for two types of
intervention-by right and by permission of the court.42 Intervention by
right requires that a proposed intervener file a timely application
showing that the applicant has an interest relating to the action which
may be impaired because that interest is not adequately represented. 3
Permissive intervention requires a timely application and demonstration
that the proposed intervener has a common question of law or fact with
the present action. 44
i.
Intervention by Right
Intervention by right would likely be preferred by responding
officials since, if demonstrated, participation must be allowed as a matter
of law. The key question would be whether public officials notified under
the Bill of Rights provision have the required interest in the class action
litigation proposed for settlement.45 Rule 24(a) does not further define
"interest," 46 but Professor Arthur Greenbaum has suggested that the
question of official interest under Rule 24(a) can be usefully considered
in several categories.47 Two of these categories are relevant here: (i)
intervention to protect the public interest; and (2) intervention to

853,998-1001 (1989).
42. FED. R. CiV. P. 24(a)-(b).
43. Id. at 24(a).
44. Id. at 24(b).

45. Timeliness is highly dependent on the discretion of judges and some issues could potentially
arise as to whether, in this context, the application to intervene has to be timely in relation to the
inception of the lawsuit or timely in relation to the government officials' § t715 notice. Greenbaum,
supra note 41, at 932-35 ("The rule provides no precise standards by which to measure the timeliness
of intervention. Rather, it is left to the discretion of the trial court, and must be evaluated within the
context of each case."). The impairment requirement is construed liberally, with courts inclined to find
impairment when an adequate interest is present. See id. at 949-50 ("[A]ny interest sufficient to
warrant protection under Rule 24 that will be affected by the pending lawsuit will justify
intervention ...but if the action will not affect that interest adversely, intervention will not lie."). The
inadequate representation requirement is liberally construed by the Supreme Court, but lower courts
occasionally disallow intervention under this requirement. See Cindy Vreeland, Comment, Public
Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 288 (i99o).
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).
47. Greenbaum, supra note 41, at 938-47.
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preserve a regulatory rule.48 The possibility of intervention to protect the
public interest received strong endorsement from the United States
Supreme Court in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas
Co.49 In that case, the Court held that California had a right to intervene
in litigation concerning the divestiture of a pipeline corporation by a
natural gas company doing business in California." Justice Douglas wrote
that, "In the present case protection of California interests in a
competitive system was at the heart of our mandate directing
divestiture."'" He continued, "It was indeed their interests, as part of the
public interest in a competitive system, that our mandate was designed to
protect."52
The required interest of public officials is often discussed in terms of
regulatory responsibility. For example, in Scotts Valley Band of Pomo
Indians v. United States, the City of Chico, California sought to intervene
in a case brought by Native Americans to determine the status of real
property partially located within the boundaries of Chico.53 The city
contended that it had a "protectable interest in the action because of its
taxing and regulating powers" associated with the real estate located in
the city, but the district court denied intervention. 4 The Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court and agreed with the city that a right to
intervene existed.5 Similar participation was afforded a federal
regulatory interest in Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v.
PeninsulaShipbuildingAss'n.5 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the National Labor Relations Board had a right
to intervene in a case brought by a shipbuilding company against a
shipbuilder's association concerning a collective bargaining agreement. 7
2.
PermissiveIntervention
If a public official can show that his or her interest has a question of
fact or law in common with the present action, then the district court can,
48. Other categories offered by Greenbaum are intervention in areas of parallel regulatory
overlap, and intervention in areas of parallel enforcement of jointly administered programs. However,
even at an abstract level, it does not appear that either of these alternate classifications could be
applied in this instance to government intervention because there does not appear to be any
opportunity for parallel regulation or enforcement. See id. at 947-48.
49. 386 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1967).
50. Id. The case had previously been considered by the Supreme Court, which held then that a
merger violated the Clayton Act and ordered timely divestiture. See United States v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co., 376 U.S. 65t, 661-62. (1964).
51. Cascade, 386 U.S. at 135.

52. Id. Although the case was decided under an earlier version of Rule 24, Justice Douglas
indicated that the previous version was more restrictive than the current rule. Id.
53. 921 F.2d 924, 926 (9th Cir. I99o).

54. Id. at 927.
55. Id. at 928.
56. 646 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 198i).

57. Id. at 122.
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in its discretion, permit participation as a party.' Here, again, the
Supreme Court has offered encouragement regarding the prospect for
intervention. In Securities Exchange Commission v. United States Realty
& Improvement Co., the Court considered an application by the
Securities and Exchange Commission to intervene in a bankruptcy case
to oppose a reorganization plan. 9 The Commission acted "in order to
protect the interest of the public." ' The district court permitted
intervention," the Second Circuit reversed, 62 and the Supreme Court
reversed the circuit court.6' Justice Stone wrote for the Court, "[W]e
think it plain that the commission has a sufficient interest in the
maintenance of its statutory authority and the performance of its public
duties to entitle it through intervention to prevent reorganizations, which
should be subjected to its scrutiny from proceeding without it." 64
The contemporary vitality of Rule 24(b)(2) as an option for public
officials was confirmed in Newby v. Enron Corporation,where the Texas
Board of Public Accounting sought permission to intervene in the case
for the purpose of obtaining access to certain discovery protected by a
court order. 6' The Board was in the process of investigating suspected
auditing defects involved in the failure of Enron. 66 The district court, in
its discretion, permitted intervention and the court of appeals affirmed,
commenting, "Texas granted the Board broad powers of investigation to
oversee the public interest in maintaining high standards
of competence
67
and integrity in the practice of public accounting."
II.

SETTLEMENT CONTENT REGULATION

The notice provisions of the Bill of Rights are accompanied by three
58. FED. R. CIv. P. 24(b).
59- 310 U.S. 434,441 (1940).
6o. Id. at 445.
61. Id. at 443-44.
62. Id. at 444.
63. Id. at 461.
64. Id. at 460.
65. 443 F.3 d 46,417 (5th Cir. 2006).
66. Id. at 419.
67. Id. at 424; accord Davis v. S.Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 149 F.R.D. 666 (S.D. Fl. 1993) (permitting
the Attorney General of Florida to intervene as an additional representative of the as yet uncertified
class in an antitrust action brought by customers of a utility). There are, of course, a number of cases in
both categories which have denied intervention. See, e.g., United States v. Tex. E.Transmission Corp.,
923 F.2d 410, 416 (5th Cir. i991) (affirming the denial of a motion to intervene by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania in a suit brought by the EPA because, "the consent decree adequately protected state
interests and ...permissive intervention would result in undue delay."); Benford v. Am. Broad. Co.,
98 F.R.D. 42 (D. Md. 1983) (denying a request for permissive intervention by a congressional
committee); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 207 F. Supp. 252, 257 (N.D. I11.
1962)
("The Court has carefully weighed and examined all the factors involved and is of the opinion that to
permit intervention by the State will unduly delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.").
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additional provisions which establish substantive limitations on the terms
of federal class action settlements, 68 apparently the first such
Congressional regulation in history. Although these limitations are far
from comprehensive, taken together they do contribute to the shift
toward public participation fostered by the notice requirements because
Congress participates by dictating some of the terms.
A. COUPON SETTLEMENTS
A coupon settlement is an agreement which provides class members
a discount on a future purchase from the defendant rather than cash in
exchange for dismissal of the case. 69 Only class members who are willing
to do business again with the defendant receive any benefit and all other
class members typically receive no compensation. Indeed, some
defendants in coupon settlement cases may benefit by increased sales
generated by the discounts. These features have prompted critics to
suspect collusive settlements in which defendants readily agree to pay
substantial attorney fees to class counsel in exchange for an opportunity
to close a number of claims either at low cost or occasionally for profit. 0
The Bill of Rights constrains this practice in three ways. First, the
Bill requires that contingent fees in coupon settlements must be based on
the value of redeemed coupons, a measure which links the interests of
class counsel positively to coupon redemption.7 ' Second, the Bill of
Rights invites the use of expert opinion on the actual value of redeemed
coupons and requires a hearing and written judicial determination that
any coupon settlement is fair.72 Finally, the Act permits the court to
require the donation of unused coupons to charity and bars reference to
donated coupons in awarding attorney fees.73 In short, Congress has
strongly discouraged coupon settlements, if not actually prohibited them.
However, courts and commentators have pointed out that at least in
some circumstances coupon settlements can result in an efficient
resolution in class action litigation.74 But Congress has not, and probably
could not, take legislative account of such particular circumstances.
68. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1712-1714 (West 2006).
69. Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 97, 102-03.
70. See, e.g., id. at 109-12.
7.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1712(a). Non-contingent attorneys fees must also have court approval. Id.
§ 1712(b).
72. Id. § 1712(d).

73. Id. § 1712(e).
74. See Tharin & Blockovich, supra note 6, at t445 ("If structured correctly, coupon settlements
can work. Coupon settlements benefit class members when the coupon's face value exceeds the class
member's claim and the discount coupon is used to purchase the defendant's product or service. If the
coupon is transferable and a vibrant secondary market exists, the class member benefits when he sells
his coupon for more than his underlying claim."); see also In re Mex. Money Transfer Litig., S64 F.
Supp. 2d OO2, lo18 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (citing sources); Miller & Singer, supra note 69, at 113-14.
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OTHER TERMS

The Act also prohibits judicial approval of a settlement under which
any class member is required to pay fees to class counsel that would
result in a net loss to the class member, unless the court makes a written
finding that non-monetary benefits outweigh the projected class benefit."
This provision is apparently the result of a notorious settlement in
Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, in which members of a plaintiff class
suffered a net loss in the settlement of an action for fraud related to
escrow account charges. 6 The recovery per class member was small, and
the prior distribution of attorney fees in the amount of at least $8.5
million resulted in a charge being levied on the accounts of class
members.77 In fact, some class members paid as much as 4000% of their
settlement value in attorney's fees, though the amounts involved were
small. 78 Curiously, Senator Kohl's statement introducing the first version
of the Class Action Fairness Act was largely directed to a description of
the experience of a constituent who was a member of the Kamilewicz
class,79 but the legislation he proposed did not directly treat negative
settlements. 8° Also, the Bill of Rights provides that a court may not
approve a settlement which discriminates between class members based
solely on geographic location.8' This section was apparently fostered in
part by testimony about "home cooking" in settlements providing
favorable treatment for local plaintiffs."2
III. THE CLASS ACTION ENFORCEMENT MODEL

The notice and term regulation provisions of the Bill of Rights are a
successful effort to alter the class action enforcement model by
diminishing the traditional private nature of the model and introducing
active public participation. Although rarely addressed in the literature,
the Anglo-American legal system has traditionally viewed settlement as
a matter exclusively under the control of the parties and involving the
court, at most, in entering an order dismissing the case upon application
of both parties."' However, the Bill of Rights continues a trend begun in
75. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1713.

76. 92 F.3 d 506, 508-09 ( 7th Cir. 1996).
77. Id. While the Seventh Circuit declined to determine the exact amount of the fee award, they
concluded that it was likely somewhere between $8.5 and $14 million and was, thus, a material
amount. Id.
78. See Susan Koniak & George Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051 , IO63-65
(8996).
79. See I43 CONG. REC. S897 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
8o. See Class Action Fairness Act of 1997, S. 254, Io5th Cong. (1997).
81. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1714 (West 2006).
82. See S. REP. No. 123, at 5-6 (2003).

83. Typically, if not universally, such an order is entered by the court without question or
comment. This practice is so fundamental to the system that it is simply assumed, not specified, and
this helps determine the high degree of party control widely recognized as a distinctive characteristic
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1938 with the original version of Rule 23 and is analogous to a failed
effort by the Carter Administration in the late 1970s to transfer
ownership of some class action claims to the federal government and
thus severely limit the traditional private character of class actions."
More recently, there have been important proposals to shift the class
action model in the opposite direction by enhancing private participation
in federal class actions. These changes and proposed changes in the class
action model implicate the theoretical debate concerning private versus
public law enforcement.
A.

THE

B.

CARTER ERA PROPOSALS

1938 CLASS ACTION MODEL AND JUDICIAL APPROVAL
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
class actions were available in the federal courts pursuant to a series of
equity rules dating back at least to 1842. 8' The several versions of the rule
and related practice contained no explicit requirement that a settlement
be approved by the court and the model was largely private. The original
version of Rule 23,8' which replaced the equity rule and extended class
actions to common law practice,87 significantly shifted the private model
by providing in Rule 23(c) that "[a] class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without approval of the court."8 This change, contrary to
the prior equity practice, opened the door to public participation, at least
through judicial review of proposed resolutions of class actions."'
President Jimmy Carter's election campaign included a promise to
reform class action practice, and in 1977 the United States Justice
Department sent a plan to Congress.' The proposal was complex, but the
central feature was public control of some previously private class action
claims. The proposal would have eliminated Federal Rule 23 b(3), which
established the "damage" class action, and replaced it with a statutory
of the Anglo-American system. See generally Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement
in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGs L.J. I, 8 (1992) ("Adversary justice rests on two complementary

political commitments: limited government and trust in party knowledge, competence and
resourcefulness.").
84. See Small Business Judicial Access Act of 1985, H.R. 464, 99th Cong. (1985).
85. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed.

1998).
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (938), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 75-460, at 27-28 (1938).
87. See generally Stephen Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The FederalRules of
Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
88. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c) (1938), reprintedin H.R. Doc. No. 75-460, at 28 (1938).
89. The 1938 shift in Rule 23 toward public enforcement is yet another indication of the

importance of New Deal influence in the adoption of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L.
REV. 1269, 1272-79 (1997).
90. See Small Business Judicial Access Act of 1985, H.R. 464, 99th Cong. (1985); supra text
accompanying note 75.
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division of cases into "public actions" and "class compensatory" actions.'
Public actions were defined as cases involving a large number of small
commercial claims.9" In any public action the Attorney General of the
United States would be notified.93 The Attorney General might then take
over the case, refer the case to an agency to prosecute, refer the case to a
State Attorney General, or allow current counsel to prosecute the case
on behalf of the United States.' Supporters claimed that public control
would enhance protection of consumer interests while critics argued that
a large and expensive bureaucracy would be necessary to manage the
public actions.9' Ultimately, Congress rejected the plan, leaving judicial
approval of settlements under Rule 23 the limit of public involvement in
class action litigation.
C.

AGENCY COSTS

More recently the debate about federal class actions has featured a
discussion of "agency costs" and proposals which would significantly
enhance private enforcement in the class format. Professor John C.
Coffee began this movement with an important article published in 1986
in which he argued that high agency costs are common in class action
litigation." Agency costs exist because the members of a class, including
the class representative, often have little ability or incentive to monitor
their attorney.' Coffee explained that the often small stake of individual
class members typically renders the cost of supervising class counsel
prohibitive& The result, Coffee argued, is an enhanced role for class
counsel much greater than the traditional role of counsel and consequent
occasional failures by counsel to represent the best interests of class
members.'
A number of remedies have been suggested, all of which seek to
enhance private management of class litigation by changing the
incentives and roles of private actors. One particularly important
proposal was described by Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey
91. See, e.g., H.R. 464.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. The Attorney General would also be notified if there were a settlement. Id.
95. Compare Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 321 (I980), and John E.
Kennedy, Federal Class Actions: A Need for Legislative Reform, 3 2 Sw. L.J. 1209, 1211 -2 (1978), and
Patricia L. Wells, Note, Reforming Federal Class Action Procedure: An Analysis of the Justice
Department Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543 (1979), with George B. Mickum & Carol A. Rhees,
Federal Class Action Reform: A Response to the Proposed Litigation, 69 Ky. L.J. 799,825-26 (198O).
96. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L.J. 625,
628 (1986).
97. Id. at 628-29.
98. Id. at 629-30.
99. Id.

March 2007]

THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION BILL OF RIGHTS

863

Miller in a 1991 article." ° Macey and Miller proposed that class action
claims be sold at auction with the proceeds distributed to class members.
According to Macey and Miller, auction would solve the agency problem
of class actions because the winning bidder would become the claim's
sole owner, and would thus have an incentive to maximize the return on
the claim by closely monitoring counsel.' Additionally, Macey and
Miller argued, the auction model would reduce transactions costs and
increase efficiency by directing the claim to the individual who values it
most. 2 A weak version of this proposal was employed by Congress in
1995 in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act which states that the
court shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member or members of the class
determined to be the most capable of adequately representing the
class.' 3 The statute goes on to provide that the most adequate plaintiff
will presumptively be the plaintiff with the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class.0 4
D.

PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

The policy context for evaluating the Bill of Rights is the older and
larger debate about the virtues of private versus public enforcement of
legal standards.'" At least since Montesquieu and especially Bentham,",6
the topic of efficient law enforcement has attracted the attention of
theorists. Today, the goal of efficient enforcement is widely, if not
universally, accepted and the fundamental arguments for (or against) the
two alternatives are well known.
The case for public enforcement recognizes that there are situations
where private enforcement may under-deter prospective harmful
behavior.7 For example, the source of the current harm may be difficult
to identify and hence be very costly to determine. Private citizens would
find identification of the cause prohibitively costly. In this situation,
public officials can be compensated to investigate and take enforcement
action if appropriate. On the other hand, the source of the harm may be
well known but the costs of hiring an attorney and filing suit may be
greater than the predicted amount of any individual recovery. Here

Ioo. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6
(199I).
oi. Id. at io6-o8.
io2. Id. at lo8-o9.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77Z (1998).
104. Id. § 77Z-I(3)(B)(I)(bb).
105. The primary source for the discussion which follows is Keith N. Hylton, When Should We
Prefer Tort Law to EnvironmentalRegulation?, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 515-30 (2002).
lo6. See Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,
38 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 45, 45 (2000).
Io7. Hylton, supranote 1O5 , at 517-20.
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again, public enforcement is necessary, this time to pay the transaction
costs in order to deter future harmful behavior. Also, some defendants
will require punishment more severe than typical damage awards in
order to provide sufficient deterrence. In such a case, public enforcement
can provide a sufficient punishment. Overall, the case for public
enforcement is strong, but plainly limited to a number of specific factual
circumstances.
With respect to private enforcement, the favorable case focuses on
the potential malfeasance of public enforcement officials and the costs of
public information search.' With respect to malfeasance, the authority
and identity of public officials provides low cost targets for interest group
lobbying, or even bribery. But private citizens are too numerous to be
easy targets for improper influence, and therefore private enforcement
vastly reduces the risk of malfeasance. With respect to information
search, private enforcement offers low costs because private citizens in
the course of their daily lives will routinely detect harmful behavior. This
contrasts sharply with the expense of employing and outfitting public
officials to detect harmful behavior. Overall, the argument for private
enforcement is strong and plainly general in character, as compared to
the limited case for public enforcement. The case for private
enforcement rests on the sheer number of individuals and the resulting
avoidance of malfeasance and high search costs. The large number of
individuals is a general condition. The case for public enforcement rests
on elaboration of specific circumstances known to occur, but not always
existing. The case is therefore limited.
The argument for private enforcement suggests that the private
model should be preferred when general procedures are established.
Indeed, this general preference is reflected in the general character of
Anglo-American law enforcement which has always been presumptively
private. On the other hand, the theory suggests that a shift to public
enforcement ought to employ a specification of the limited circumstances
where efficiency can be achieved. The choice of a model for federal class
action procedure is a choice of general character since the application of
Rule 23 is general and not limited to specific situations. Similarly, the Bill
of Rights notice and term limit provisions are general since they too
apply to all federal class actions."° Therefore, according to the theory, a
private class action model should be preferred.

io8. Id. at

520-28.

to9. This analysis, of course, suggests that the Carter era proposals discussed above, see supra text
accompanying note 84, may well have been more efficient than the 2005 legislation since the earlier
proposal was more narrowly focused by specific category, i.e., cases involving a number of small
commercial claims. See supra text accompanying note 92.
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IV. JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS

The jurisdictional provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act have
received considerable attention in early comment." t Essentially, the act
expands original diversity jurisdiction in class actions and provides a
special removal procedure that facilitates use of the expanded
jurisdiction. The exact scope of the new jurisdiction was much debated in
Congress and fostered several complex exceptions designed to keep local
action in state court.
A.

JURISDICTION

Section 4 of the Class Action Fairness Act expands federal diversity
jurisdiction over any class action with one hundred or more class
members in which the aggregate claims of class members exceeds $5
million and diversity exists between at least one class member and one
defendant."' Congress's use of a "minimal diversity" standard thus
abandons the traditional statutory requirement of perfect diversity." and
stretches diversity to the boundary of Article III. The expanded
jurisdiction is available in any action filed under Federal Rule 23 or any
similar state provision. ' There are important exceptions in the Act to
this expansion of diversity, chief of which are available when the primary
defendants are local state citizens." 4 Essentially, in this situation, if onethird or fewer of the plaintiff class members are local citizens, expanded
federal jurisdiction will be available." 5 If one-third to two-thirds are local,
expanded federal jurisdiction is discretionary, and if more than twothirds of the class are local citizens, expanded federal jurisdiction is
prohibited.,6
Section 5 of the Class Action Fairness Act provides removal options
which will facilitate use of the expanded diversity jurisdiction. For
example, the current requirement that removal must occur within one
year of filing is deleted for litigation covered by the Class Action
Fairness Act."7 Also, defendants may remove regardless of being a local
Iio. See, e.g., Symposium, Class Action in the GulfSouth and Beyond, 8o TUL. L. REV. 1591 (2006).
iii. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (West 2oo6).
112. The requirement stems from an early construction of the diversity statute. See Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (i8o6) (construing the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (789)).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(i)(B). Federal securities actions are excluded. Id. § 1332(d)(9)(a).
114. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I).
115. Id. § 1332(d).
116. Id. This third category also provides an alternative technique for identifying a local defendant,
apparently useful in the event the "primary defendants" are not local state citizens. See id.
§ 1332(d)(3). The more general identification of local defendants based on the state citizenship is also
available. Id. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc). Expanded jurisdiction is not available in any class action
brought against states or state officials. Id. § 13 3 2(d)(5)(A). Also excluded are class actions brought
under the federal securities laws and actions involving the "internal affairs" of local corporations. Id.
§ 1332(d)(9).
117. Id. § 1453(b).
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citizen, which is contrary to general removal provisions, and any one
defendant may remove a class action without the consent of all
defendants," 8 which is generally required. Contrary to general removal
practice, an appeal opportunity is allowed by the legislation," 9 subject to
several specified time requirements obviously intended to prevent
strategic efforts to delay trial court actions.' 0
B.

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDY

During consideration of the Class Action Fairness Act but before
passage, the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules asked the
Federal Judicial Center, the education and research agency of the federal
courts, to undertake a comparative study of class actions focusing on the
validity of any assumption about differences in treatment in state and
federal courts.'2 ' The method chosen by Thomas Willging and Shannon
Wheatman was a survey of attorneys in a random sample of recently
terminated cases in state and federal court.' They sent detailed
questionnaires to 2132 attorneys in 1235 class action cases and received
728 responses, which was a sufficient response to test the statistical
significance of any differences. The sample included typical class action
subject matter such as personal injury and civil rights claims.
The most important questions posed by Willging and Wheatman
were why attorneys in class action cases chose a state or federal forum
and whether the choice produced different results.' 3 The answers were
quite clear. First, Willging and Wheatman found that attorneys in class
action believe that the choice of state or federal forum is important, with
plaintiffs' attorneys generally preferring state court and defendants'
attorneys generally preferring federal courts. The conclusion with respect
to defendants' attorneys is both important here and striking: "In their
responses to our survey, defendant attorneys described an almost totally
favorable legal environment for their clients in the federal courts-a
convergence of judicial receptivity, predispositions, and favorable
substantive and procedural rules."'" Second, Willging and Wheatman
concluded that in fact the choice mattered very little. "State forums were
not typically more favorable for plaintiffs, and federal forums were not
typically more favorable for defendants.' ' 25 The results of the study
ii8. Id.
119. Id. § 1453(c).

120. Id. Like the jurisdictional provisions, the removal section also does not apply to federal
securities actions and state law claims relating to the internal affairs of corporations. Id. § 1453(d).
121.

Thomas Willging & Shannon Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action
,
DAME L. REV. 591 593 n.i (2006).

Litigation: What Difference Does it Make?, 81 NOTRE
122. Id. at 600-02.
123. See id. at 634-40.
124. See id. at 653.
125.

Id. at 654.
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suggest that the bulk of major class action litigation will now take place
in federal courts because defense attorneys strongly believe the federal
forum is favorable and will therefore routinely use the expanded
jurisdiction to remove class actions. However, the study suggests, that
this removal practice will not result in different outcomes, only more
class action litigation in federal court.
CONCLUSION

The Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights will, I predict, open the
door to active involvement by numerous state and federal public officials
in the federal class action settlement process which is central to federal
class action litigation. If the federal class action docket is expanded, as
seems likely as a result of the Class Action Fairness Act jurisdictional
provisions, the notice and term regulations of the Bill will gain added
significance, because those provisions would apply then to most major
class actions brought in the United States. Indeed, this expansion of
notice and term limit provisions on class action settlements will likely be
the only significant effect of the jurisdictional provisions.
Together these two seemingly disparate aspects of the Class Action
Fairness Act will bring about the most significant shift toward public
enforcement in the class action format since the adoption of the original
Rule 23 in 1938 and the requirement of judicial approval of class action
settlements. This shift will result in increased malfeasance by public
officials, likely in this context to take the form of enhancing political self
interest. The shift will also result in increased information search costs in
the form of notice costs and expenses associated with subsequent official
investigation and participation in the settlement process. A better
solution would have been legislation shifting the class action process in
the opposite direction toward a private enforcement model by reducing
the agency cost problem described by commentators and enhancing
private monitoring. Although public participation might also reduce
agency cost problems of class members, alternatives are available which
achieve the same result without inviting malfeasance in the form of
politically motivated intervention. The case for this solution is well
established and the theoretical predictions of such a change are clear:
more efficient law enforcement in the class action format. A well
functioning private enforcement model would avoid the possible
malfeasance of public officials and benefit from low information search
costs.
This solution would also have avoided a political mistake made by
both the national Republican and Democratic parties. Supporters of the
Republican Party will some day be very disappointed in the shift toward
public participation in class action litigation. They will wonder why the
party traditionally opposed to government intervention came to open the
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door to government participation in most major class action settlements.
Democrats will be puzzled when recalling their party's vigorous
opposition to the same legislation. They will wonder why the party
traditionally willing to employ government intervention came to oppose
government participation in most major class action settlement. Indeed,
the only political winners are likely to be the State Attorneys General,
regardless of party, for whom the Bill of Rights provides a platform for
political advancement at both the state and the national level.

